Presentation
TetrisLock: Quantum Circuit Split Compilation with Interlocking Patterns
DescriptionIn quantum computing, quantum circuits are fundamental representations of quantum algorithms, which are compiled into executable functions for quantum solutions. Quantum compilers transform algorithmic quantum circuits into one compatible with target quantum computer, bridging quantum software and hardware. However, untrusted quantum compilers pose significant risks. They can lead to the theft of quantum circuit designs and compromise sensitive intellectual property (IP).
In this paper, we propose TetrisLock, a split compilation method for quantum circuit obfuscation that uses an interlocking splitting pattern to effectively protect IP with minimal resource overhead. Our approach divides the quantum circuit into two interdependent segments, ensuring that reconstructing the original circuit functionality is possible only by combining both segments and eliminating redundancies. This method makes reverse engineering by an untrusted compiler unrealizable, as the original circuit is never fully shared with any single entity.
Also, our approach eliminates the need for a trusted compiler to process the inserted random circuit, thereby relaxing the requirements. Additionally, it defends against colluding attackers while imposing low overhead by preserving the original depth of the quantum circuit. We demonstrate our method by using established RevLib benchmarks, showing that it achieves a minimal impact on functional accuracy (less than 1%) while significantly reducing the likelihood of IP inference.
In this paper, we propose TetrisLock, a split compilation method for quantum circuit obfuscation that uses an interlocking splitting pattern to effectively protect IP with minimal resource overhead. Our approach divides the quantum circuit into two interdependent segments, ensuring that reconstructing the original circuit functionality is possible only by combining both segments and eliminating redundancies. This method makes reverse engineering by an untrusted compiler unrealizable, as the original circuit is never fully shared with any single entity.
Also, our approach eliminates the need for a trusted compiler to process the inserted random circuit, thereby relaxing the requirements. Additionally, it defends against colluding attackers while imposing low overhead by preserving the original depth of the quantum circuit. We demonstrate our method by using established RevLib benchmarks, showing that it achieves a minimal impact on functional accuracy (less than 1%) while significantly reducing the likelihood of IP inference.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeMonday, June 2311:45am - 12:00pm PDT
Location3003, Level 3
Security
SEC3: Hardware Security: Attack & Defense