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DTSTAMP:20260402T024534Z
LOCATION:3008\, Level 3
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250623T103000
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UID:dac_DAC 2025_sess151_RESEARCH534@linklings.com
SUMMARY:IntraFuzz: Coverage-Guided Intra-Enclave Fuzzing for Intel SGX App
 lications
DESCRIPTION:Jinhua Cui, Qiao Peng, Yiwen Yao, Ke Ye, and Jiliang Zhang (Hu
 nan University)\n\nIntel SGX is susceptible to intra-enclave software vuln
 erabilities. Existing automated bug-finding methods primarily focus on fuz
 zing enclave boundaries for SGX applications in simulated, rather than act
 ual hardware-protected enclaves. This limits the ability to identify poten
 tial security violations originating from within SGX application code. Thi
 s paper presents IntraFuzz, a system that enables efficient fuzzing of SGX
  applications inside actual hardware enclaves. We evaluated IntraFuzz with
  21 real-world SGX applications, running on Intel Xeon scalable processors
  with up to 256 GB of enclave page cache. IntraFuzz successfully detected 
 all vulnerabilities in SGX application code previously identified by the s
 tate-of-the-art tool EnclaveFuzz, as well as 6 previously undiscovered vul
 nerabilities. These results highlight the importance of hardware-based fuz
 zing in securing SGX applications.\n\nTopics: Security\n\nTracks: SEC2: Ha
 rdware Security: Primitives & Architecture, Design & Test\n\nSession Chair
 s: Samuel Pagliarini (Carnegie Mellon University) and Gang Qu (University 
 of Maryland)\n\n
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